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ABSTRACT
We present a controller synthesis algorithm for a discrete
time reach-avoid problem in the presence of adversaries. Our
model of the adversary captures typical malicious attacks en-
visioned on cyber-physical systems such as sensor spoofing,
controller corruption, and actuator intrusion. After formu-
lating the problem in a general setting, we present a sound
and complete algorithm for the case with linear dynamics
and an adversary with a budget on the total L2-norm of
its actions. The algorithm relies on a result from linear
control theory that enables us to decompose and precisely
compute the reachable states of the system in terms of a
symbolic simulation of the adversary-free dynamics and the
total uncertainty induced by the adversary. With this de-
composition, the synthesis problem eliminates the universal
quantifier on the adversary’s choices and the symbolic con-
troller actions can be effectively solved using an SMT solver.
The constraints induced by the adversary are computed by
solving second-order cone programmings. The algorithm is
later extended to synthesize state-dependent controller and
to generate attacks for the adversary. We present prelimi-
nary experimental results that show the effectiveness of this
approach on several example problems.
Keywords
Cyber-physical security, constraint-based synthesis, controller
synthesis
1. INTRODUCTION
We study a discrete time synthesis problem for a plant
simultaneously acted-upon by a controller and an adver-
sary . Synthesizing controller strategies for stabilization in
the face of random noise or disturbances is one of the classi-
cal problem in control theory [1, 2]. Synthesis for temporal
logic specifications [3–5], for discrete, continuous, and hy-
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brid systems have been studied in detail. The reach-avoid
properties that our controllers target are special, bounded-
time temporal logic requirements, and they have received
special attention as well [6]. Unlike the existing models in
controller synthesis literature, however, the system here is
afflicted by an adversary and we would like to synthesize
a controller that guarantees its safety and liveness for all
possible choices made by the adversary.
This problem is motivated by the urgent social to secure
control modules in critical infrastructures and safety-critical
systems against malicious attacks [7, 8]. Common modes of
attack include sensor spoofing or jamming, malicious code,
and actuator intrusion. Abstracting the mechanisms used to
launch the attacks, their effect on physical plant can be cap-
tured as a switched system with inputs from the controller
and the adversary:
xt+1 = fσt(xt, ut, at),
where xt is the state of the system, ut and at are the inputs
from the controller and the adversary. The problem is pa-
rameterized by a family of dynamical functions {fσ}σ∈Σ, a
switching signal {σt}t∈N, a time bound T , the set of initial
sates (Init), target states (Goal), safe states (Safe), the set
of choices available to the adversary (Adv) and the controller
(Ctr). A natural decision problem is to ask: Does there exist
a controller strategy u ∈ Ctr such that for any initial state
in Init , and any choice by the adversary in Adv the system
remains Safe and reaches Goal within time T . A construc-
tive affirmative answer can be used to implement controllers
that are Adv-resilient, while a negative answer can inform
the system design choices that influence the other parame-
ters like f , T and Ctr.
We provide a decision procedure for this problem for the
special case where f is a linear mapping, the sets Init , Safe,
Goal , and Ctr sets are given as by polytopic sets and Adv is
given as an `2 ball in an Euclidean space. The idea be-
hind the algorithm is a novel decomposition that distin-
guishes it from the LTL-based synthesis approaches [3] and
reachability-based techniques of [6]. The key to this decom-
position is the concept of adversarial leverage: the uncer-
tainty in the state of the system induced by the sequence of
choices made by the adversary, for a given initial state and a
sequence of choices made by the controller. For linear mod-
els, we show that the adversary leverage can be computed
exactly. As a result, an adversary-free synthesis problem
with a modified set of Safe and Goal requirements, precisely
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gives the solution for the problem with adversary.
We implement the algorithm with a convex optimization
package CVXOPT [9] and an SMT solver Z3 [10]. We present
experimental results that show the effectiveness of this ap-
proach on several example problems. The algorithm synthe-
sizes adversary-resilient control for systems with up to 16
dimensions in minutes. We have that the algorithm can be
applied to to analyze the maximum power of the adversary
such that a feasible solution exists and to synthesize attacks
for adversary.
Advancing Science of Security.
Scientific security analysis is necessarily parameterized by
the the skill and effort level of the adversary. In this pa-
per we combine these parameters into a single parameter
called the budget of the adversary which can model sensor
attacks and actuator intrusions with different strengths and
persistence. We present the foundations for analyzing cyber-
physical systems under attack from these adversaries with
different budgets. Specifically, we develop algorithms for
both automatic synthesis of safe controllers and for proving
that there exists no satisfactory controller, when the adver-
sary has a certain budget. These algorithms can be also
used to characterize vulnerability of system states in terms
of the adversary budget that make them infeasible for safe
control. In summary, we present a framework for algorith-
mically studying security of cyberphysical systems in the
context of model-based development.
2. RELATEDWORK
In this work, we employ SMT solvers to synthesize con-
trollers for reach-avoid problems for discrete-time linear sys-
tems with adversaries. Our problem is formulated along the
line of the framework and fundamental design goals of [7,11].
The framework was applied to study optimal control design
with respect a given objective function under security con-
straints [12] and the detection of computer attacks with the
knowledge of the physical system [13]. Similar frameworks
were adopted in [14] where the authors proposed an effec-
tive algorithm to estimate the system states and designed
feedback controllers to stabilize the system under adver-
saries, and in [15] where a optimal controller is designed
for a distributed control system with communication delays.
Although the motivation of the above studies are similar to
ours, we focus on another aspect of the problem which is to
synthesize attack-resilient control automatically.
The idea of using SMT solvers to synthesize feedback con-
trollers for control systems is inspired by recent works [16,
17]. In [16], the authors used SMT solvers to synthesize in-
tegrated task and motion plans by constructing a placement
graph. In [17], a constraint-based approach was developed
to solve games on infinite graphs between the system and
the adversary. Our work extend the idea of constraint-based
synthesis by introducing control theoretic approaches to de-
rived the constraints.
The authors of [6, 18] proposed a game theoretical ap-
proach to synthesize controller for the reach-avoid problem,
first for continuous and later for switched systems. In these
approaches, the reach set of the system is computed by solv-
ing a non-linear Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDE. Our method-
ology, instead of formulating a general optimization problem
for which the solution may not be easily computable, solves
a special case exactly and efficiently. With this building
block, we are able to solve more general problems through
abstraction and refinement.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this paper, we focus on discrete linear time varying
(LTV) systems. Consider the discrete type linear control
system evolving according to the equation:
xt+1 = Atxt +Btut + Ctat, (1)
where for each time instant t ∈ N, xt ∈ X ⊆ Rn is the state
vector of the controlled plant, ut ∈ U ⊆ Rm is controller
input to the plant, and at ∈ A ⊆ Rl is adversarial input to
the plant. For a fixed time horizon T ∈ N, let us denote
sequences of controller and adversary inputs by u ∈ UT
and a ∈ AT . In addition to the sequence of matrices At,
Bt, Ct, and a time bound T , the linear adversarial reach-
avoid control problem or ARAC in short is parameterized
by: (i) three sets of states Init ,Safe,Goal ⊆ X called the
initial, safe and goal states, (ii) a set Ctr ⊆ UT called the
controller constraints, and (iii) a set Adv ⊆ AT called the
adversary constraints. We will assume finite representations
of these sets such as polytopes and we will state these repre-
sentational assumptions explicitly later. A controller input
sequence u is admissible if it meets the constraints Ctr, that
is, u ∈ Ctr, and a adversarial input sequence is admissible
if a ∈ Adv. We define what is means to solve a ARAC
problem with an open loop controller strategy.
Definition 1. A solution to a ARAC is an input sequence
u ∈ Ctr such that for any initial state x ∈ Init and any
admissible sequence of adversarial inputs a ∈ Adv, the states
visited by the system satisfies the condition:
• (Safe) for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, xt ∈ Safe and
• (Winning) xT ∈ Goal.
In this paper we propose an algorithm that given a ARAC
problem, either computes its solution or proves that there
is none. In the next section, we discuss how the problem
captures instances of control synthesis problems for cyber-
physical systems under several different types of attacks.
Helicopter Autopilot Example
To make this discussion concrete we consider an autonomous
helicopter. The state vector of the plant x ∈ R16; the con-
trol input vector u ∈ R4 with bounded range of each com-
ponent. The descriptions of the state and input vectors are
in Table 1. The dynamics of the helicopter is given in [19],
which can be discretized into a linear time-invariant system:
xt+1 = Axt + But. The auto-pilot is supposed to take the
helicopter to a waypoint in a 3D-maze within a bounded
time T (Goal) and avoid the mapped building and trees.
The complement of these obstacles in the 3D space define
the Safe set (see Figure 1).
The computation of the control inputs (ut) typically in-
volves sensing the observable part of the states, computing
the inputs to the plant, and feeding the inputs through actu-
ators. In a cyber-physical system, the mechanisms involved
in each of these steps can be attacked and different attacks
give rise to different instances of ARAC .
Controller and Actuator attacks. An adversary with soft-
ware privileges may compromise a part of the controller soft-
ware. A network-level adversary may inject spurious packets
Figure 1: Helicopter fly through scene. Red boxes are the
obstacles, the cyan box on the right is the goal states, the
green ball on the left is a set of initial states and the blue
curve is a sampled trajectory of the helicopter with a random
adversary input.
in the channel between the controller and the actuator. An
adversary with hardware access may directly tamper with
the actuator and add an input signal of at. Under many
circumstances, it is reasonable to expect these attacks to be
transient or short-lived compared T (for example, otherwise
they will be diagnosed and mitigated). Then the actual in-
put to the system becomes u′t = ut+at and the dynamics of
the complete system is modified to xt+1 = Axt+But+Bat,
which gives an instance of ARAC .
Sensor attacks. Another type of adversary spoofs the he-
licopter’s sensors, the GPS, the gyroscope, so that the po-
sition estimator is noisy. Consider a control systems where
the adversary-free control ut is a function on the sequence
of sensor data. If the adversary injects an additive error
to the sensors, then the control inputs computed based on
this inaccurate data will be added an error; also the initial
state will have uncertainty. We model the additive error
by the adversary input at. Once again, this gives rise to
an instance of ARAC . Assuming that the injection of at
requires energy and that the adversary has limited energy
for launching the attack then gives rise the adversary class
Adv =
∑T
i=0 ||at||2 ≤ b where b is the energy budget.
States/ Inputs Description
[px, py, pz] Cartesian Coordinates
[u, v, w] Cartesian Velocities
[p, q, r] Euler Angular Rates
[a, b, c, d] Flapping Angles
[ϕ, φ, θ] Euler Angles
uz Lateral Cyclic Deflection in [-1,1]
ux Longitudinal Cyclic Deflection in [-1,1]
up Pedal Control Input in [-1,1]
uc Collective Control Input in [0,1]
Table 1: States and inputs of the helicopter model.
4. ALGORITHM FOR LINEAR ARAC
4.1 Preliminaries and Notations
For a natural number n ∈ N, [n] is the set {0, 1, . . . , n−1}.
For a sequence A of objects of any type with n elements, we
refer to the ith element, i ≤ n by Ai. For a real-valued vector
v ∈ Rn, ||v|| is its `2-norm. For δ ≥ 0, the set Bδ(v) denotes
the closed ball {x ∈ Rn | ||v − x|| ≤ δ} centered at v. For
a parameter  > 0 and a compact set A ⊆ Rn, an -cover of
A is a finite set C = {ai}i∈I ⊆ A such that ∪i∈IB(ai) ⊇ A.
For two sets A,B ⊆ Rn, the direct sum A⊕B = {x ∈ Rn :
∃a ∈ A,∃b ∈ B, a+ b = x}. For a vector v, we denote A⊕ v
as A ⊕ {v}. Sets in Rn will be represented by finite union
of balls or polytopes. An n-dimensional polytope P = {x ∈
Rn : Ax ≤ b} is specified by a matrix A ∈ Rm×n and
a vector b ∈ Rm, where m is the number of constraints. A
polytopic set is a finite union of polytopes and is specified by
a sequence of matrices and vectors. A polytopic set can be
written in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF), where (i) the
complete formula is a conjunction of clauses, and (ii) each
clauses is disjunction of linear inequalities.
In this paper, we will assume that the initial set Init is
given as a ball Bδ(θ) ⊆ X for some θ ∈ X and δ > 0. We
also fix the time horizon T . The set Adv is specified by a
budget b ≥ 0: Adv = {a ∈ AT : ∑t ||at||2 ≤ b}. The set
Ctr is specified by a polytopic set.
For a sequence of matrices {At}t∈N, for any 0 ≤ t0 < t1,
we denote the transition matrix from t0 to t1 inductively as
α(t1, t0) = At1−1α(t1 − 1, t0) and α(t0, t0) = I.
A trajectory of length T for the system is a sequence
x0, x1, . . . , xT such that x0 ∈ Init and each xt+1 is induc-
tively obtained from Equation (1) by the application of some
admissable controller and adversary inputs. The tth state of
a trajectory is uniquely defined by the choice of an initial
state x0 ∈ Init , an admissible control input u ∈ Ctr and an
admissible adversary input a ∈ Adv. We denote this state
as ξ(x0,u,a, t).
The notion of a trajectory is naturally extended to sets of
trajectories with sets of initial states and inputs. For a time
t ∈ [T + 1], a subset of initial states Θ ⊆ Init , a subset of
adversary inputs A ⊆ Adv, and a subset of controller inputs
U ⊆ Ctr, we define:
Reach(Θ,U,A, t) = {ξ(x0,u,a, t) : x0 ∈ Θ ∧ a ∈ A}.
For a singleton u ∈ U , we write Reach(Θ, {u}, Adv, t) as
Reach(Θ,u, t). To solve ARAC then we have to decide if
∃ u ∈ Ctr : (∧t∈[T+1]Reach(Init ,u, t) ⊆ Safe)
∧ Reach(Init ,u, T ) ⊆ Goal .
(2)
This representation hides the dependence of the Reach sets
on the set of adversary choices.
4.2 Decoupling
In this section, we present a technique to decouple the
ARAC problem. The decomposition relies on a result from
robust control that enables us to precisely compute the reach-
able states of the system in terms of a symbolic simulation
of the adversary-free dynamics and the total uncertainty in-
duced by the adversary. In Section 4.6, we present an algo-
rithm that performs this decomposition such as to eliminate
the universal quantifier on the adversary’s choices and initial
states in Definition 2 and 3.
4.3 Adversarial Leverage
Definition 2. For any t ∈ [T + 1], the adversary leverage
at t, initial state x0 ∈ Init, and any control u ∈ Ctr, the
adversary leverage is a set R(x0,u, t) such that
Reach(x0,u, t) = ξ(x0,u, 0, t)⊕R(x0,u, t) (3)
Informally, the adversary leverage captures how much an ad-
versary can drive the trajectory from an adversary-free tra-
jectory.It decomposes the reach set Reach(x0,u, t) into two
parts: a deterministic adversary-free trajectory ξ(x0,u, 0),
and the reachtube R(x0,u, t) that captures the nondeter-
minism introduced by the adversary. Our solution for ARAC
heavily relies on computing over-approximations of reach
sets and to that end, observe that is suffices to over-approximate
adversary leverage. For certain classes of non-linear systems,
it can be over-approximated statically using techniques from
robust control, such as H∞ control. It can also be approx-
imated dynamically by reachability algorithms that handle
nondeterministic modes (see, for example [20,21]).
For the ARAC problem with linear dynamics described
in (1), where the adversary inputAdv = {a ∈ AT : ∑t ||at||2≤ b} is defined by a budget b ≥ 0, we can compute adver-
sary leverage precisely. The following lemma is completely
standard in linear control theory.
Lemma 1. For any time t ∈ [T + 1], if the controllability
Gramian of the adversary Wt =
∑t−1
s=0 α(t, s+1)CsC
T
s α
T (t, s+
1) is invertible, then
R(x0,u, t) = {x ∈ Rn : xTW−1t x ≤ b}
is the precise adversary leverage at t.
Proof. For t ∈ [T + 1], we have
xt = α(t, 0)x0+
t−1∑
s=0
α(t, s+1)Bsus+
t−1∑
s=0
α(t, s+1)Csas. (4)
Since ξ(x0,u, 0, t) = A
tx0 +
∑t−1
s=0 α(t, s+ 1)Bsus, we have
R(x0,u, t) = {x ∈ Rn : x =
t−1∑
s=0
α(t, s+1)Csas ∧
T−1∑
t=0
||as||2 ≤ b},
which is the set {x ∈ Rn : xTW−1t x ≤ b}, with controllabil-
ity Gramian Wt.
The above lemma establishes a precise adversary leverage
as an ellipsoid defined by the controllability Gramian Wt
and b. In this case, the ellipsoid is independent of x0 an u
and only depends on t. Here on, we will drop the arguments
of R when they are reduandant or clear from context. If Wt
is singular for some t ∈ [T + 1], then replace the inverse of
Wt by its pseudo-inverse and the set R is an ellipsoid in the
controllable subspace.
4.4 Uncertainty in Initial Set
Following the above discussion, we show that a similar
decomposition of the reachable states is possible with respect
to the uncertainty in the initial state.
Definition 3. Consider the initial set Init to be Bδ(x0) for
some δ > 0 and x0 ∈ X . For a t ∈ [T + 1] and a control
input u, the initialization factor at t is a set B(x0,u, t), such
that
Reach(Bδ(x0),u, 0, t) = ξ(x0,u, 0, t)⊕B(x0,u, t). (5)
The initialization factor captures the degree to which the
uncertainty δ in the initial set can make the adversary-free
trajectories deviate. For general nonlinear models, we will
have to rely on over-approximating initialization factor [],
but for the liner version of ARAC the following lemma pro-
vides a precise procedure for computing it.
Lemma 2. For an initial set Init = Bδ(θ) ⊆ Rn, for any
t ∈ [T + 1], input u ∈ Ctr, if the matrix α(t, 0)Tα(t, 0) is
invertible then
B(θ,u, t) = {x ∈ Rn : xT [αT (t, 0)α(t, 0)]−1x ≤ δ1/2}
is the precise initialization factor at t.
If the matrix A is singular, then a similar statement holds
in terms of the pseudo-inverse of [αT (t, 0)α(t, 0)]. Thus, ini-
tialization factor is an ellipsoid defined by A, t and δ and is
independent of x0 an u. We will drop the arguments of B
when they are redundant or clear from context.
4.5 Adversary-free Constraints
Using the decomposition of the reach set given by the
above lemmas, we will first solve a new reach-avoid syn-
thesis problem for the adversary-free system. To construct
this new problem we will modify the safety and winning
constraints of the ARAC . For a given time instant, the
new constraints are obtained using the same approach as
in robotic planning with The synthesis problem requires a
solution to a sequence of such problems.
Definition 4. Given a set S ⊆ Rn and a compact convex
set R ⊆ Rn, a set S′ ⊆ Rn is a strengthening of S by R if
S′ ⊕R ⊆ S. (6)
A strengthening S′ is precise if it equals R ⊕ S. The
strengthening S′ is a subset of S that is shrunk by the set
R. If S is a polytopic set and R is a convex compact set
then exact solutions to the following optimization problem
yields precise strengthening.
Lemma 3. For a half hyperplane S = {x ∈ Rn : cTx ≤ b}
and a convex compact set R, a precise strengthening of S by
R is S′ = {x ∈ Rn : cTx ≤ b− cTx∗} such that
x∗ = arg min
x∈R
−cTx. (7)
.
Proof. Fix any x ∈ R and y ∈ S′. From the definition of S′,
cT y + b∗ ≤ b. Since x∗ minimizes −cTx in R and x ∈ R,
we have −cTx ≥ −cTx∗ = b∗. It follows that cT (x + y) ≤
cT y + cTx∗ ≤ cT y + b∗ ≤ b. Thus x + y ∈ S and therefore
S′ ⊕R ⊆ S.
For any y ∈ S, it holds that cT y ≤ b. Let y′ = y − x∗. It
follows that cT y′ = cT y − cTx∗ ≤ b − cTx∗. Thus y′ ∈ S′.
Combined with x∗ ∈ R, y = y′ + x∗ ∈ S′ ⊕ R. Therefore
S′ ⊕R ⊆ S.
Since a polytopic set is a union of intersections of linear
inequalities, the above lemma generalizes to polytopic sets
in natural way.
Corollary 4. For a polytopic set S = {x ∈ Rn : ∨i∈[m]Aix ≤
bi} and a compact convex set R ⊆ Rn,
S′ = {x ∈ Rn :
∨
i∈[m]
Aix ≤ bi − b∗i },
is a precise strengthening of S by R. Here the jth element
of b∗i equals c
Tx∗ with cT being the jth row of Ai and x∗ is
the solution of (7).
4.6 An Algorithm for Linear ARAC
We present algorithm 1 for solving the linear version of
the ARAC problem.
Algorithm 1: Synthesis(Init ,Safe,Goal , Adv, Ctr, T )
1 for t ∈ [T + 1] do
2 Rt ← AdvDrift(Adv, t);
3 Bt ← InitCover(Init , t);
4 Safe ′t ← Strengthen(Safe, Rt, Bt);
5 end
6 Goal ′ ← Strengthen(Goal , RT , BT );
7 (u,Failed)← SolveSMT (θ,Safe ′,Goal ′, Ctr, T );
8 return (u,Failed)
The subroutine AdvDrift computes a precise adversary
leverage Rt for every time t ∈ [T + 1]. From Lemma 1, Rt is
an ellipsoid represented by the controllability Gramian and
the constant b. The subroutine InitCover computes a ini-
tialization factor described in Lemma 2 for each t. The sub-
routine Strengthen computes a precise strengthening of the
safety constraints Safe by both sets Rt and Bt. From Corol-
lary 4, the strengthening is computed by solving a sequence
of optimization problems. Since Rt and Bt are both ellip-
soids (Lemma 1 and 2), the optimization problems solved by
Strengthen are quadratically constrained linear optimization
problems and are solved efficiently by second-order cone pro-
gramming [22] or semidefinite programming [23]. For each
t ∈ [T+1], the set Safe is strengthened by the corresponding
adversary drift Rt to get Safe
′
t. The Goal set is strength-
ened respect to the adversary drift at the final time T to get
Goal ′. Finally, SolveSMT makes a call to an SMT solver
to check if there exists a satisfiable assignment u ∈ Ctr for
quantifier-free formula (8):
∃ u ∈ Ctr ∧
(∧t∈[T+1]ξ(θ,u, 0, t) ∈ Safe ′t) ∧ ξ(θ,u, 0, T ) ∈ Goal ′.
(8)
For the class of problems we generate, the SMT solver ter-
minates and either returns a satisfying assignment u or it
proclaims the problem is unsatisfiable by returning Failed .
If AdvDrift , InitCover and Strengthen compute adversary
leverage, initialization factor and strengthening precisely,
then Algorithm 1 is a sound and complete for the linear
ARAC problem.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 1 outputs u ∈ Ctr if and only if u
solves ARAC .
Proof. Suppose Algorithm returns u ∈ Ctr. We will first
show that u solves ARAC . Since u satisfies constraints (8),
for every t ∈ [T +1], ξ(θ,u, 0, t) ∈ St. Since St is a strength-
ening of Safe by Rt and Bt, we have St ⊕ Rt ⊕ Bt ⊆ Safe.
Thus,
ξ(θ,u, 0, t)⊕ St ⊕Bt ⊆ Safe. (9)
By Definition 2 and 3, we have
ξ(θ,u, 0, t)⊕ Safe ′t ⊕Bt ⊇ Reach(θ,u, Adv, t)⊕Bt
⊇ Reach(Init ,u, t).
(10)
Combining (9) and (10), we have Reach(Init ,u, t) ⊆ Safe.
That is the safety condition of (2) holds. Similarly, since
Goal ′ is the strengthening of Goal by RT and BT , we have
Reach(Init ,u, T ) ⊆ Goal . The winning condition also holds.
On the other side, suppose u ∈ Ctr solves ARAC , it
satisfies (2). Since the adversary leverage Rt, initialization
factor Bt and strengthening Safe
′,Goal ′ are computed pre-
cisely, Equations (9) and (10) take equality. Thus, for any
t ∈ [T + 1], ξ(θ,u, 0, t) ∈ Safe ′t and ξ(θ,u, 0, T ) ∈ Goal ′.
Therefore u is returned by Algorithm 1.
The completeness of the algorithm is based on two facts:
(i) adversary leverage, initialization factor and strengthen-
ing can be computed precisely, and (ii) the SMT solver is
complete for formula (8). The exact computation of adver-
sary leverage and initialization factor require that the ini-
tial state Init and admissible adversary Adv are described
by `2 balls. Since Ctr, Safe ′ and Goal ′ are polytopic sets,
formula (8) is a quantifier-free theory in linear arithmetic,
which can be solved efficiently for example by algorithm
DPLL(T) [24].
5. GENERALIZATIONS
In this section, we discuss two orthogonal generalizations
of linear ARAC and algorithms for solving them building on
the algorithm Synthesis. First in Section 5.1, we present an
approximate approach to solve a problem where Init , Adv
and Ctr are general compact convex sets. Then, in Sec-
tion 5.2, we modified the definition of linear ARAC problem
such that the controller can be a function of the initial states.
A solution of this problem is a look-up table, where the con-
troller choose a sequence of open loop control depending on
the initial state.
5.1 Synthesis for Generalized Sets
We generalize the linear ARAC problem described in Sec-
tion 4.1 such that Init ⊆ X , Ctr ⊆ UT and Adv ⊆ AT are
assumed to be some compact subsets of Euclidean space.
For a precision parameter  > 0, the generalized ARAC
problem can be approximated by a linear ARAC problem.
We define robustness of a ARAC problem.
We present an extension of Synthesis to solve this prob-
lem. For a parameter  > 0, and compact convex sets
Init , Adc, Ctr, we construct a tuple (Θ,A, C) such that
(i) Θ = {θi}i∈I is an -cover of initial set Init , that is,
Init ⊆ ∪iB(θi).
(ii) A = {aj}j∈J is an -cover of the adversary. Here each
aj is seen as a vector in Euclidean space AT and the
union of -balls around each aj over-approximates Adv.
(iii) C ⊆ Ctr ⊆ UT is a polytopic set such that dH(C, Ctr) ≤
, That is, C under-approximates the actual constraints
of control Ctr, with error bounded by  measured by
Hausdorff distance.
The modified algorithm to approximately solve the gener-
alized ARAC problem follows the same steps as Algorithm 1
from line 1 to line 6. The only change is in line 7, where
instead of solving an SMT formula (8) we solve (11).
∃ u : u ∈ C ∧
(∧t∈[T+1] ∧i∈I ∧j∈Jξ(θi,u,aj , t) ∈ Safe ′t) ∧
(∧i∈I ∧j∈J ξ(θ,ui,aj , T ) ∈ Goal ′)
(11)
The soundness of this modified algorithm is independent
of the choice of  > 0. That is, if it returns a satisfiable
assignment u, then u solves the ARAC problem.
Lemma 6. If the modified algorithm returns u ∈ C, then u
solves linear generalized ARAC .
Proof. Suppose u ∈ C ⊆ Ctr satisfies (11). Since Θ and A
are -cover of Init and Adv, there exist a initial state θi ∈
for any t ∈ [T + 1] we have
Reach(Init ,u, Adv, t) ⊆ Reach(∪i∈IB(θi),u,∪j∈JB(aj), t).
Let Rt and Bt be the precise adversary leverage and initial-
ization factor as in Algorithm 1. From Lemma 1 and 2, Rt
and Bt are independent on the initial state and adversary
input. Therefore,
Reach(Init ,u, Adv, t)
= ∪i∈I ∪j∈J Reach(B(θi),u,B(aj), t)
= ∪i∈I ∪j∈J (ξ(θi,u,aj , t)⊕Rt ⊕Bt)
= (∪i∈I ∪j∈J ξ(θi,u,aj , t))⊕Rt ⊕Bt.
(12)
From formula (11) implies that (∪i∈I ∪j∈J ξ(θi,u,aj , t)) ⊆
Safe ′t for any t ∈ [T + 1] and (∪i∈I ∪j∈J ξ(θi,u,aj , T )) ⊆
Goal ′. Since Safe ′t is an Rt⊕Bt strengthening of Safe, it fol-
lows from Definition 4 and (12) that Reach(Init ,u, Adv, t) ⊆
Safe for all t ∈ [T + 1] and Reach(Init ,u, Adv, T ) ⊆ Goal .
That is, u solves the generalized linear ARAC .
We observe that if the approximated algorithm success-
fully synthesize a control, the control solves the general-
ized linear ARAC problem, no matter what value  > 0
takes. Moreover, as the parameter  converges to 0, we have
∪i∈IB(θi), ∪j∈JB(aj) and C converge to the exact Init ,
Adv and Ctr, respectively.
5.2 State-dependent Control
In this section, we keep the same definition of Init , Adv
and Ctr as in Section 4.1, however, we consider a variant of
ARAC that allows the choice of control u to be depend on
the initial state of the system. That is, we have to decide if
∀ x0 ∈ Init : ∃ u ∈ Ctr :
(∧t∈[T+1]Reach(x0,u, t) ⊆ Safe) ∧ Reach(x0,u, T ) ⊆ Goal .
(13)
A solution to this generalized ARAC problem is a look-up
table {(Ii,ui)}i∈I such that (i) the union ∪i∈IIi ⊇ Init
covers the initial set, and (ii) for every x0 ∈ Ii, ui is an
admissible input such that the constraints in (13) hold.
We present an Algorithm 2 to solve this problem and it
uses Synthesis as an subroutine. If the algorithm succeeds,
it returns a look-up table Tab which solves the above state-
dependent variant of ARAC .
The parameters Adv,Ctr,Safe,Goal , T are invariant in
the algorithm, thus we omit it as arguments of Synthesis.
The variable  is initialized as the diameter of the initial
set Init (line 1). The subroutine Cover(Init , ) in line first
computes an -cover {θi}i∈I of Init , and then append each
θi with the parameter . The set S stores all such pairs
(θ, ), such that the -ball around θ is yet to examined by
the algorithm for Synthesis. For each ball B(θ) in S, the
subroutine Synthesis is possibly called twice for both the
ball B(θ) and the single initial state θ to decide whether
the Synthesis is successful, a failure, or whether further re-
finement is needed.
Algorithm 2: TableSynthesis
1 ←Dia(Init);
2 S ←Cover(Init , );
3 Tab← ∅;
4 while S 6= ∅ For (θ, ) ∈ S do
5 S ← S/{(θ, )};
6 if Synthesis(B(θ)) returns u ∈ Ctr then
7 Tab← Tab∪{(B(θ),u)};
8 else if Synthesis(B(θ)) failed then
9 return (θ,Failed)
10 else
11 S ← S ∪ Cover(Init ∩ B(θ), /2);
12 end
13 end
14 return (Tab, Success)
Theorem 7. If TableSynthesis returns (Tab,Success), then
Tab solves the state-dependent ARAC . Otherwise if Ta-
blesynthesis returns (θ,Failed), then there is no solution for
initial state θ.
Proof. We first state an invariant of the while loop which can
be proved straightforwardly through induction. For any iter-
ation, suppose Tab= {(Bi(θi),ui)}i∈I and S = {θ′j , ′j}j∈J
are the valuations of Tab and S at the beginning of the it-
eration. Then we have (∪i∈iBi(θi))∪ (∪j∈JB′j (θ
′
j)) ⊇ Init .
Suppose TableSynthesis returns (Tab,Success) with Tab=
{(Bi(θi),ui)}i∈I . From line 4, S = ∅. From the loop
invariant, we have ∪i∈iBi(θi) ⊇ Init . Moreover for any
(B(θ),u) ∈Tab, from line 6 and Theorem 5, for any x0 ∈
B(θ), u is an admissible input such that constraints in ??
hold. Thus Tab solves the state-dependent ARAC .
Otherwise suppose TableSynthesis returns (θ,Failed). From
line 8 and Theorem 5, there is no admissible u solve the
ARAC from θ.
The Algorithm 2 is sound, that is, if the algorithm termi-
nates, it always returns the right answer. For general sets of
Adv and Ctr the approach from Section 5.1 can be combined
Algorithm 2 to get state dependent (but u and a oblivious)
controllers.
6. IMPLEMENTATIONANDEXPERIMEN-
TAL EVALUATION
We have implemented the algorithm Synthesis in a pro-
totype tool in Python. The optimization problem presented
in Lemma 3 is solved by a second-order cone programming
solver provided by package CVXOPT [9]. The quantifier-
free SMT formula (8) is solved by Z3 solver [10]. In Sec-
tion 6.1 and 6.2, we present the implementation of the basic
Figure 2: Sampled Trajectories of Helicopter Auto-pilot.
Safety and winning conditions hold.
algorithm synthesis, show an example in detail, present the
experiment results and discuss the complexity of the algo-
rithm. In Section 6.3 and 6.4, we present several different
applications of Synthesis.
6.1 Synthesizing Adversary Resistant Controllers
We have solved several linear ARAC problems for a 16-
dimensional helicopter system (as described in 3) and a 4-
dimensional vehicle.
We illustrate an instance of the synthesis of the helicopter
auto-pilot for time bound T = 9 in Figure 2. The state
variables, control input variables and the constraint Ctr of
the system are listed in Table 1. We model an actuator
intrusion attack such that the control input is tempered by
an amount of at at each time t ∈ [T ]. The total amount of
spoofing is bounded by a budget b = 1.
A control u = {ut}t∈[T ] is synthesized by Synthesis. We
randomly sample adversary inputs a with
∑
t∈[T ] ||at||2 = b,
and visualize the corresponding trajectories with control u
in Figure 2.
Besides the Helicopter model, we studied an discrete vari-
ation of the navigation problem of a 4-dimensional vehicle,
where the states are positions and velocities in Cartesian
coordinates, and the controller and adversary compete to
decide accelerations in both direction.
The experimental results for different instances are listed
in Table 2, where the columns represent (i) the model of the
complete system, (ii) the dimension of state, control input
and adversary input vectors, (iii) the time bound, (iv) the
length of formula representing Safe and number of obstacles,
(v) the length of formula representing Goal and Ctr, (vi) the
length of the quantifier-free formula in (2), (vii) the synthesis
result, and (vii) the running time of the synthesis algorithm.
From the result, we observe that the algorithm can synthe-
size controller for lower dimensional system for a relatively
long horizon (320) for reasonable amount of time. For higher
dimensional system (16-dimensional), the approach scales to
an horizon T = 15. The run time of the algorithm grows ex-
ponentially with the time bound T . By Comparing row 2-4,
we observe that the runtime grows linearly with the number
of obstacles.
6.2 Discussion on Complexity of Safety Con-
straints
Let the quantifier-free constraints in (2) be specified by an
CNF formula φ, where each atomic proposition is a linear
constrain. We denote |φ| as the length of the CNF formula
which is the number of atomic propositions in φ. Notice
that if we convert an CNF formula into a form of union of
polytopes, the size of the formula can grow exponentially.
Similarly, let CNF formula φSafe , φGoal and φCtr specify the
constraints Safe,Goal ⊆ X and Ctr ⊆ UT . It can be derived
from (2) that |φ| = T |φSafe | + |φGoal | + |φCtr|. If fixed the
length of the projection of φCtr on control ut for each t, that
is, we assume the controller constraints at different times are
comparably complex, then |φCtr| grows linear with the time
bound T . Suppose the length of |φSafe |, |φGoal | are constant,
then the length of φ is linear to the time bound T .
The length of φSafe is a function of the number and com-
plexity of obstacles. Suppose that the safe region Safe ′ is
obtained by adding an polytopic obstacle O = {x ∈ Rn :
Ax < b} to a safe region Safe. One measure of complexity
of the obstacle is the number of rows of the matrix A. Then,
the resulting safe region is Safe ′ = Safe\O, which implies
φSafe′ = φSafe ∧ ¬(Ax < b) = φSafe ∧ (∨i −Aix ≤ −b),
where Ai is the i
th row of A. Therefore the length of φSafe
increases linearly with the number of obstacles and the num-
ber of faces in every obstacle.
In the experiments, we observe that the running time of
Z3 to solve the SMT formula varies on a case by case basis.
The size of obstacles, the volume of the obstacle-free region
and the length of significant digits of entries the constraints
and dynamic matrices also affect the running time.
6.3 Vulnerability Analysis of Initial States
Using Synthesis, we can examine the vulnerability of ini-
tial states to attackers. Fixing a controller constraint Ctr, a
time bound T , safety condition Safe and winning condition
Goal , for each initial state Init , there exists a maximum crit-
ical budget bmfc of the adversary Adv, such that beyond this
budget, the problem becomes infeasible. The lower the bmfc
for an initial state is, it is vulnerable to a weaker adversary.
The maximum budget can be found by a binary search on
the adversary budget with Synthesis.
We examine the vulnerability of an instance of the 4-
dimensional autonomous vehicle system. The result is il-
lustrated in Figure 3, where the box at the bottom repre-
sent the Goal , the red regions represent the obstacle whose
complement is the Safe, the green-black on the top region
is the Init . The black regions are most vulnerable with
bmfc = 0 and the lightest green region are least vulnerable
with bmcc = 1.8. We see that the region closer to an obstacle
are darker as an adversary with relatively small budget (b)
can make the vehicle run into an obstacle. We also observe
that the dark regions are shifted towards the center since the
obstacles are aggregated at the center of the plane. Avoiding
them may cause a controller run out of the time bound.
6.4 Attack Synthesis
The Synthesis subroutine can also be used to generate
attacks by swathing the roles of the adversary and the con-
troller. In this section, we synthesize adversarial attacks to
the 4-dimensional vehicle such that the system will be driven
to unsafe states in a bounded time T . That is, for a state
x ∈ X , we decide whether
∃ a ∈ Adv ∀ u ∈ Ctr :
(∨t∈[T ]ξ(x,u,a, t) ∈ Unsafe).
(14)
Complete System # x, u, a T |φSafe |,#Obs |φGoal |, |φCtr| |φ| Result Run Time (s)
Vehicle 4,2,2
40 16, 3 4, 160 804 unsat 2.79
80 20, 4 4, 320 1924 sat 16.49
80 44, 10 4, 320 3844 sat 35.22
80 84, 20 4, 320 7044 sat 53.8
160 20, 5 4, 640 3844 sat 91.78
320 24, 6 4, 1280 8964 sat 532.5
Helicopter 16,4,4
5 18, 3 6,40 136 sat 1.2
5 24, 4 6,40 166 unsat 0.61
7 24, 4 9, 56 213 sat 8.2
9 36, 6 6, 72 402 sat 24.5
12 24,4 6, 96, 338 sat 60.6
15 24, 4 6, 96, 576 sat 158.8
18 24, 4 10, 96, 640 – –
Table 2: Experimental results for Synthesis
Figure 3: Vulnerability Analysis of Initial States. Adversary
may cause the system to hit an obstacle or delay the time
of reaching beyond T
Notice that (14) is essentially the same as (2) by switching
the roles of u and a, and negating Safe to get Unsafe.
We suppose that the set of adversarial input Adv is a poly-
topic set and the control Ctr = {u ∈ UT : ∑t∈T ||ut||2 ≤ b}
is specified by budget b ≥ 0. For general convex compact
sets Ctr and Adv, one can come up with an under approxi-
mated Adv as polytopic set and an over-approximated Ctr
with budget b. As we discuss in Section 5.1, this approxi-
mation is sound.
We synthesize a look-up table {(Ii,ai)}i as the strategy
of the adversary, such that (i) Ii ⊆ X , and (ii) for each state
x ∈ Ii, the corresponding adversary ai satisfies (14). During
the evolution of the plant under controller, the adversary
act only when the system reaches a state x ∈ Ii for some
Ii in the look-up table, then the corresponding attack ai is
triggered at x which breaks the safety of the system.
The synthesis of attacks uses similar idea of creating cov-
ers of the states as in TableSynthesis without refinements.
Figure 4: Attack Generation. The darker a region is, a larger
portion of velocity is vulnerable. If the vehicle visit a region
near to an obstacle, it could survive only if its initial velocity
is pointing outwards.
Suppose the set of states X ⊆ R4 is compact. An adversary
first creates a uniform cover of the state space, then search
for an attack for each cover. If the synthesis succeed and re-
turns an attack a, then the cover is vulnerable and is stored
in the look-up table of attacks paired with the attack a.
A result of the synthesis is illustrated in 4, where the
red boxes specify obstacles. The vulnerable covers, each
of which is a subset of R4, are projected on the 2-D plane
and visualized as blue regions, where the white region are
not vulnerable to attackers. The darkness of a region corre-
sponds to the number of vulnerable covers have projection in
the region. That is, if the vehicle is in a dark region, a large
portion of its velocity space is vulnerable under attacks that
makes the system unsafe. A sample trajectory is captured
by the green curve, where, as it enters light shadow region,
its velocity does not fall into a vulnerable cover right away.
As it approach further, it enters a vulnerable cover and an
attack is triggered at the point with cross mark.
7. CONCLUSION
We present a controller synthesis algorithm for a discrete
time reach-avoid problem in the presence of adversaries.
Specifically, we present a sound and complete algorithm for
the case with linear time-varying dynamics and an adversary
with a budget on the total L2-norm of its actions. The algo-
rithm combines techniques in control theory and synthesis
approaches coming from formal method and programming
language researches. Our approach first precisely converts
the reach set of the complete system into a composition of
non-determinism from the adversary input and the choice
of initial state, and an adversary-free trajectory with fixed
initial state. Then we enhance the Safe and Goal conditions
by solving a sequence of quadratic-constrained linear opti-
mization problem. And finally we derive a linear quantifier-
free SMT formula for the adversary-free trajectories, which
can be solved effectively by SMT solvers. The algorithm is
then extended to solve problems with more general initial set
and constraints of controller and adversary. We present pre-
liminary experimental results that show the effectiveness of
this approach on several example problems. The algorithm
synthesizes adversary-resilient controls for a 4-dimensional
system for 320 rounds and for a 16-dimensional system for
15 rounds in minutes. The algorithm is extended to analyze
vulnerability of states and to synthesize attacks.
Future Direction
There are several interesting follow-up research topics. For
example, the solution of linear ARAC can be used to solve
adversary-free nonlinear avoid-reach problems, where the
dynamics can be linearized along a nominal trajectory and
the linearization error is modeled as adversary.
We also planned to extend the approach to synthesize
switched controller for infinite horizon by applying a sim-
ilar approach as suggested in [25].
Another interesting direction is to precisely define a dual
problem of the linear ARAC . Since reachability is dual to
detectability, we envision that there exists a detectability
type problem dual to ARAC , such that the adversary adds
noise to the measurements. The question is then how well
we can estimate whether the system is in unsafe state based
on the noisy measurements.
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